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ETHICS AND MALPRACTICE
David Luban*
In Carlson v. Morton,1 Montanajoined the numerous jurisdictions that refuse to
find that violations of lawyers' ethical codes constitute sufficient grounds for es-
tablishing legal malpractice; instead, the Montana Supreme Court requires expert
testimony to demonstrate that the standard of due care was not met. 2 A related is-
sue surfaced in Garcia v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb,3 where the court
found that breach of New Mexico's ethics rules does not give rise to a private cause
of action for damages against attorneys. 4 Garcia combines this issue with another
extremely interesting one, namely whether a lawyer owes actionable duties toward
his adversaries. The court echoed the opinion that a party can never, or virtually
never, sue an adversary attorney for negligence.5
Both issues -the use of ethical codes to establish malpractice, and the possibil-
ity of establishing negligence against an adversary attorney -are reasonably well
settled. Most courts deny liability under either theory. Yet both doctrines deserve
a close second look, for there are strong reasons in favor of liability, while the tra-
ditional reasons for opposing it are surprisingly flimsy. Or so I shall suggest.
I.
The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility denies that its provisions
"define standards of civil liability,"6 and the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct states in the scope section of its preamble that "[v]iolation of a Rule
should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it create any presumption that a
legal duty has been breached."7 Both the Carlson and Garcia courts took these dis-
claimers as stopping points for their analyses, where in point of fact the disclaim-
ers should scarcely be treated even as starting points. Why, after all, should an
organization of professionals be able to conjure civil liability away at its own say-
so? In the case of the Model Rules, whose passage by the ABA House of Delegates
was accompanied by fierce public bickering,8 it is especially clear that bar politics
plays an enormous role in the formulation of ethical codes; one might well imagine
that without some disclaimer regarding civil liability, the Model Rules, and proba-
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland; Research Scholar, Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy. This
article is a revised version of a commentary that appeared in the National Reporter on Legal Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility.
1. 745 P.2d 1133 (Mont. 1987).
2. Id. at 1136-38.
3. 750 P.2d 118 (N.M. 1988).
4. Id. at 123-24.
5. Id. at 122.
6. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (preliminary statement) (1981).
7. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (scope) (1991) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
8. See Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
14 LAw& Soc. INQ. 677 (1989).
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bly the Code, would never have been passed. No professional association can be
expected to approve elaborate sets of rules enumerating grounds for suing its mem-
bers. And, conversely, the bare fact that the ABA says that its members should not
be sued when they violate the rules intended as enforceable standards should be
regarded simply as wishful thinking, not authoritative pronouncement. 9
Shortly I shall suggest some more convincing reasons why the codes should not
be used to define civil liability; first, however, I sketch the affirmative case for
employing the codes as malpractice standards." Essentially there are two argu-
ments, one practical and one theoretical.
A. The Practical Argument
The practical argument begins with the routine observation that the codes are
drastically underenforced. A glance through any month's listings of attorney disci-
plinary matters, in any state, reveals a typical pattern. Virtually every case con-
cerns lawyers stealing their clients' money, being convicted of other felonies, or
grossly neglecting client affairs. Alcohol and drug abuse are implicated in the bulk
of these cases. Thus, if one were to give realistic advice to aspiring lawyers about
how to avoid attorney discipline, it would be this: "If you don't steal your clients'
money, neglect their affairs, get convicted of a felony, engage in substance abuse,
or get caught lying to a court, you have little to fear from the disciplinary system."
But what about all those carefully crafted rules in the Code and Model Rules?
With one exception to be noted, they are close to dead letter. One simply does not
find attorneys being disciplined for failing to report other lawyers' violations of the
rules (DR 1-103(A), Model Rule 8.3(a)), 1 making public statements concerning
the merits of criminal cases they are defending (DR 7-107(B), Model Rule 3.6),
failing to reveal client fraud to an affected person (DR 7-102(B)(1) injurisdictions
that do not include the "except" clause), or billing a finder's fee (DR 2-107, Model
Rule 1.5(e)). Yet few observers of the legal scene would deny that these are very
common infractions.
The only rigorously enforced ethical rules (apart from those mentioned, which
impose discipline on thieving, felonious, and neglectful lawyers) are the rules con-
cerning conflicts of interest violations which are almost never addressed through
the disciplinary process. Instead, these violations are litigated in the form of mo-
tions to disqualify conflict-ridden opposing counsel. In other words, the conflict
9. Neither Montana nor New Mexico adopted these disclaimers with their codes of professional responsibil-
ity.
10. The most influential advocate of this affirmative view is Charles W. Wolfram, author of Modern Legal
Ethics and reporter for the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers. See Charles W. Wolfram, The Code of
Professional Responsibility as a Measure of Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S. C. L. REv. 281 (1979)
[hereinafter Wolfram]. Perhaps the best arguments in the negative are found in Robert Dahlquist, The Code of
Professional Responsibility and Civil Damage Actions Against Attorneys, 9 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 1(1982) [hereinaf-
ter Dahlquist].
11. The exception to this assertion is one that truly proves the rule. In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (I11. 1988),
is the first and, to my knowledge, only reported decision imposing discipline for an attorney's failure to report
collegial misconduct. The factual circumstance in this case were highly atypical. See Ronald Rotunda, The Law-
yer's Duty to Report Another Lawyer's Unethical Violations in the Wake of Himmel, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 977.
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of interest rules are enforced only because they may be pressed into service as liti-
gation weapons. The lesson could not be more clear: ethical rules will lie fallow
unless an adversary attorney - not a layperson, but an attorney - can gain an ad-
vantage by invoking the rule in court-not before a grievance committee, but a
court. Underlining this general law is the fact that, although every successful dis-
qualification motion implies that the conflicts rules have been violated, which
could logically lead to disciplinary proceedings, the losing lawyers (typically
large, prestigious law firms) are never disciplined.
As corrobation, consider as well the attempt to regulate excess zeal. Discipli-
nary Rule (DR) 7-102(A)(2) states that "a lawyer shall not knowingly advance a
claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that he may ad-
vance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law."12 Model Rule 3.1 employs
very similar language, except that the subjective element implied by the word
"knowingly" does not appear.13 Both rules are virtually dead letter in the grievance
process. However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1114 is directed to the same end
of preventing frivolous litigation, and is drafted in almost the same words as
Model Rule 3.11" and DR 7-102(A)(2). After the rule was strengthened in 1983,
motions for Rule 11 sanctions became an often-employed tactical tool. The same
two points made about the conflict rules emerge clearly in the case of Rule 11.
First, ethical rules against frivolous litigation will lie unenforced unless an adver-
sary attorney - not a layperson - can gain advantage by invoking the rule in court.
Second, and underlining the first, one looks in vain for collateral disciplinary pro-
ceedings growing out of the explosion of Rule 11 sanctions.
The logical conclusion is that the ethics codes will continue to warm the bench
until lawyers are given causes of action based on the codes, as in the case of the
conflict of interest rules and Rule 11. Hence, the practical attractiveness of the
proposal to attach civil damages to ethical breaches.16 Presumably, enforcing the
codes would help deter attorneys from violating them, and, if our general law is
right, the codes will not be enforced until adversary attorneys-not laypersons -
are provided with handles and incentives for invoking them in court.
Of course, one might reply that the codes are not meant to be enforced. They
are aspirations, ethical ideals, serving a primarily hortatory function, not hard
law. This reply, however, is wrong in almost every way. The codes have always
been treated as hard law when it suited the purposes of the bar (as in the meticu-
lously detailed regulation of advertising, or the unauthorized practice provisions);
and a glance at the content of the rules should suffice to disabuse us of the notion
that they are merely aspirational. What is "aspirational" about rules requiring law-
12. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(2) (1981).
13. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1990).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
15. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1990).
16. See Wolfram, supm note 10, at 290-93.
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yers not to write themselves into their clients' will (EC 5-517)? Moreover, the tran-
sition from the 1908 Canons to the Code to the Model Rules has at each stage
toned down the rhetoric of morality and added emphasis to the notion that rules set
a regulatory framework.18
In fact, the only way the objection makes sense is in its most cynical reading.
For decades critics of the legal profession have charged that its ethical codes are
never meant to be enforced, and that they are merely public relations documents,
designed to mollify the world at large and to ensure that control of the profession
remains in its own hands.
To this argument the reply is that even if that's the way the world is, it's not the
way the world should be. Even if the ethics codes are hypocritical, it is still open
to us to enforce them nonhypocritically. Hypocrisy, La Rochefoucauld wrote, is
the homage vice pays to virtue. Why not instead just try to promote virtue?
B. The Theoretical Argument
The question whether violating a statutory standard in and of itself constitutes
negligence is standard fare in the first year torts course, and casebooks typically
point out that courts split on the issue in different contexts. " The theoretical argu-
ment for utilizing the ethics codes as malpractice standards derives from the fact
that a judgment of attorney negligence and a judgment that an attorney has
breached the ethics codes carry closely related meanings. Saying that an attorney
has been negligent means that he or she has failed to carry out a professional duty
as carefully as a reasonable professional should. Though this does not imply that
the attorney has been unethical, the converse relationship must hold. An attorney
who violates the ethics rules is subject to discipline that can include suspension or
disbarment. Discipline is imposed "to protect the public and the administration of
justice from lawyers who have demonstrated by their conduct that they are unable
or likely to be unable to properly discharge their professional duties."2 To engage
in conduct that warrants discipline is thus, almost by definition, to engage in con-
duct that falls below a "reasonable professional" standard of care. 2 In short: while
negligence need not imply a breach of ethics, a breach of ethics is bound to be neg-
ligence (provided of course that the other elements - damage and causation - are
met).
Carlson perfectly illustrates the point. Its facts are egregious indeed: Morton, a
bank officer moonlighting as a lawyer, represented and advised Carlson in matters
embroiling Carlson in financial obligations to Morton's bank.22 Eventually the
17. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-5 (1981).
18. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L. J. 1239(1991) (detailing evolution
of ethics codes from fraternal admonition to legal regulation).
19. See Nazareno v. Urie, 638 P.2d 671 (Alaska 1981); Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 806 (Ct. App. N.Y.
1920).
20. ABA STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS Standard I. I 91979) [hereinaf-
ter ABA STANDARDS].
21. See generally WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 161 (4th ed. 197 1) [hereinafter PROSSER].
22. Carlson, 745 P.2d at 1134.
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bank sued Carlson, alleging in its suit that Carlson had taken certain illegal actions
that Morton himself, in his role as Carlson's lawyer, had advised.23 Indeed, the
bank's affidavit included confidential information given by Carlson to Morton in
the course of their attorney-client relation.24 Carlson charged that Morton had ne-
glected his affairs and lied to him and that Morton's undoubted violation of various
Disciplinary Rules (DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 4-101(B), several Canon 5 rules, DR 6-
101, and DR 7-102) constituted clear negligence, so clear that no expert testimony
was required.2" The Montana Supreme Court disagreed, enunciating a rule that in
the future will compel malpractice plaintiffs to undertake the needless expense of
hiring an expert to testify that flagrant attorney dishonesty, double-dealing, and
conflict of interest is indeed "improper and negligent."26
This irrational result might be defended by arguing that even if the Disciplinary
Rules were taken as a standard of civil liability, a legal ethics expert would still be
required to prove that Morton's behavior violated them. On the facts of Carlson
this would be a difficult argument to make, since the DRs in question are straight-
forward and Morton's behavior quite clearly violated them. Moreover, there
seems to be no reason that the question of whether a set of facts violates legal
standards should not be put directly to a jury. That's what juries are for.
As I have indicated, however, the argument took a different turn, with the court
asserting that the Code cannot be taken as a civil liability standard to begin with. I
suggest, to the contrary, that facts such as those in Carlson are precisely the kind in
which it makes the most sense to use the Code as a measure of malpractice liabil-
ity. Egregious multiple Code violations such as those described in Carlson show
not only that the attorney is "unable or likely to be unable to discharge his profes-
sional duties"27 (the condition that triggers discipline), but also, and for that rea-
son, that the conduct falls below the "reasonable attorney" standard used to
establish negligence.28 According to Robert Dahlquist, the Code and the Rules
"state the minimum acceptable level of attorney conduct while civil liability is
based on the expected conduct of a reasonable and prudent lawyer."29 Since the lat-
ter standard is higher, any violations of the codes is a fortiori negligent. However,
since the converse is not true, attorneys should never be able to escape liability by
arguing that their actions conformed to the codes; actions can be negligent while
remaining above the minimum acceptable level of attorney conduct.
II.
The argument, then, is that breach of the ethics codes is a breach of duty consti-
tuting negligence. Several doubts arise in connection with this argument, how-
23. Id. at 1134-35.
24. Id. at 1135.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 20.
28. See PRossER, supra note 21.
29. Dahlquist, supr note 10, at 23.
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ever. The most significant is that the lawyer's duty to obey the ethics codes is not a
duty to the client (or other malpractice plaintiff), but is owed instead to "the ad-
ministration of justice," 30 to the courts, and to the public generally. In one version
of the objection, it simply begs the question to assume that the duties contained in
the ethics codes run to individual malpractice plaintiffs. In another version, the
lawyer's duty to obey the ethics codes is a public duty, since an attorney is an offi-
cer of the court. In that case it falls under the "public duty doctrine,"31 which fore-
closes negligence actions against public officials who inadequately perform their
duties. The public duty doctrine postulates, for example, that the duty of a police
officer is to apprehend criminals. That duty is owed to the public generally, not to
specific members of the public.32 Thus, if a criminal mugs a citizen after the po-
lice have negligently failed to apprehend him, the citizen has no cause of action
against he negligent police officer because the officer's duty does not run to the
citizen, who is the victim of the criminal's violence. Similarly, in the case of the
unethical lawyer, although the client is injured, the lawyer's duty runs to the public
and not the client; thus, the client has no grounds of recovery.
However, the public duty doctrine is gradually eroding the courts,33 and in any
event, as Prosser observes, "[tihe statement that there is or is not a duty begs the
essential question -whether the plaintiffs interests are entitled to legal protection
against the defendant's conduct. 34 If it begs the question to assert, as this argu-
ment does, that the duties contained in the ethics codes run to the malpractice
plaintiff, it begs the question equally to assert that they do not.
In fact, the problem is more a notional difficulty than a real one. It should not
prove too difficult to avoid begging the question. Surely we can determine in a
common-sense fashion which rules are intended to establish duties to individuals
and which are not. As an example of a rule that does not establish a duty to anyone,
consider DR 2-108(B),35 which reads "[i]n connection with the settlement of a
controversy or suit, a lawyer shall not enter into an agreement that restricts his
right to practice law."36 Equally clear, DR 2-107,37 concerning fee splitting, is in-
tended to protect clients, and should therefore be taken as a standard for civil lia-
bility.
38
This kind of rule-by-rule inquiry is difficult only for rules that seem designed to
protect the administration of justice, or the integrity of the courts, rather than any
30. See MODEL RULES, supra note 7.
31. See generally PROSSER, supra note 21, at § 132.
32. South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396 (1856). See also Note, Police Liability for Negligent Failure to
Prevent Crime, 94 HARV. L. REv. 821 (1981) [hereinafter Police Liability].
33. See Police Liability, supra note 32.
34. PROSSER, supra note 21, at 325. The author wishes to thank Professor Oscar Gray for the points raised here
concerning the public duty exception.
35. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108(B) (1981).
36. Id.




person. Take for example Model Rule 3.3, "Candor Toward the Tribunal"," or DR
7-106, "Trial Conduct."4" Violating them will often harm other people, particu-
larly adversaries, but it seems that whatever duty they establish runs to the courts,
and at best indirectly to the injured parties. Why, then, give these injured parties a
cause of action based on the rules?
The issue that underlies such concerns is that malpractice actions were tradi-
tionally limited to parties in privity with the lawyer, and that meant the lawyer's
clients. In Savings Bank v. Ward,41 the Supreme Court invoked privity in legal mal-
practice to prevent the "floodgates of litigation" from opening.42 In other areas of
tort, of course, privity has disintegrated through the twentieth century. The ero-
sion of privity in legal malpractice began with Biakanja v. Irving' and Lucas v.
Hamm." Currently the major exceptions to privity are malpractice actions
brought by intended beneficiaries of negligently drafted wills and by parties who
relied on badly executed title searches. Virtually all courts allow such actions to be
brought. There is no reason why the privity rule should not erode still further.
It is virtually certain that this issue will arise repeatedly, and in highly sophisti-
cated litigation, over the next few years. In the wake of widespread bank and thrift
failures, typically resulting from speculative loans and unwise investments during
the "Get Rich Quick Eighties," creditors (including the Resolution Trust Corpora-
tion) have begun to search for deep pockets to sue in order to recoup some of their
losses. Conspicuously, these deep pockets include the famous and wealthy law
firms whose opinion letters and participation in shaky mega-deals taped together
the financial houses of cards that subsequently collapsed. Investors and other in-
stitutions that joined mega-deals in reliance on the opinion letters and integrity of
the major Wall Street law firms have filed hundreds of suits against these firms -
suits that will test the privity rule in the most strenuous way. As the magnitude of
the law firms' greed and folly becomes clearer, we may expect the privity rule to
erode.
Particularly in the situations considered here, where the party in privity with
the lawyer is something as abstract as the administration of justice or the court, it
would be mad to permit the privity rule to block liability to someone injured be-
cause a lawyer has violated an ethical rule. The court, after all, imposes duties on
lawyers such as the requirement of candor, in order best to serve and protect the
interests of litigants before it. A lawyer does not lie to the court for the fun of lying
to the court, but in order to win the case and to beat the adversary and the court
requires candor not simply to protect its own dignity, but more importantly to pro-
tect those people who will be wronged if the lying lawyer wins the case - most ob-
viously, the adversary. It would be ridiculous, then, to deny the existence of a duty
39. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 3.3 (1990).
40. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106 (1981).
41. 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
42. Id. at 202.
43. 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958).
44. 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961).
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to the adversary by arguing that the duty runs only to the court. That is to ignore
the fact that the court imposes the duty for the sake of individuals, including the
adversary.
Then should parties be able to sue adversary lawyers who injure them by violat-
ing the ethics codes? Yes, indeed. Let us turn forthwith to the Garcia case, which
concerns precisely this issue.
III.
Garcia has very rich facts. Garcia sued school board members in both their in-
dividual and official capacities for failing to renew his employment contract.
45
During the trial, the judge suggested that to avoid confusing the jurors, Garcia
should drop his claims against the board members in their individual capacities.'
In chambers the next day, Garcia's counsel agreed to do so." The judge stated to
defense counsel, "I mean if the plaintiff were recovering, then all at once the
school district will not respond or claim some kind of immunity or something,"'
and the defense counsel agreed that they would raise no immunity defenses."9 Gar-
cia won, and notwithstanding the conversation with the trial judge, the defendant
raised an Eleventh Amendment immunity claim on appeal, and the court of ap-
peals reversed the judgement.50
Garcia then sued defense counsel for malpractice, alleging that by saying they
would not raise an immunity issue and then raising it nevertheless on appeal, de-
fense counsel had breached a duty to Garcia.51 Among other grounds, Garcia ar-
gued "that New Mexico's former Code of Professional Responsibility . ..give[s]
rise to a private cause of action for damages against attorneys.1"52 The opinion does
not detail which provisions of the Code Garcia claimed that the defendants had
breached; presumably he alleged a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4)"3 which states that
"[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or mis-
representation."
4
In any event, the court gave the argument short shrift. Like the court in
Carlson, the court said that the Code was never intended as a malpractice stand-
ard. However, the most important argument is this, which is here quoted at length:
An attorney has no duty however to protect the interests of a non-client adverse party
for the obvious reasons that the adverse party is not the intended beneficiary of the
45. Garcia, 750 P.2d at 120.
46. Id. These facts raise several interesting questions unrelated to our current topic. For example, did the trial
judge fail in his own professional responsibility to protect Garcia's lawyers to agree to waive a defense that their
own duty of zealous advocacy compels them to raise?
47. Id. at 120.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 120-2 1.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 123.
53. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4) (1981).
54. Garcia, 750 P.2d at 123.
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attorney's services . . . . An adverse party cannot justifiably rely on the opposing
lawyer to protect him from harm; negligence contemplates a legal duty owing from
one party to another and the violation of that duty by the person owing it. In the
present context, this duty is owed by the lawyer to his client and to the legal sys-
tem . . . . Historically, our court system has always been adversarial in nature. The
role of the attorney therein is to represent and advocate a client's cause of action as
vigorously as the rules of law and professional ethics will permit. For that reason an
attorney's exclusive and paramount duty must be to the client alone and this duty can-
not run to the client's adversary . . . . [T]he attorney's ongoing and justifiable con-
cern with being sued for negligence would detrimentally interfere with the
attorney-client relationship . . . . As a matter of public policy in order to maintain
and enforce the fidelity and duty of the attorney toward the client, we cannot jeop-
ardize the integrity of the adversarial system by imposing a professional duty on an
attorney toward an adverse party.
55
Here we find all the most important arguments for the long-standing doctrine
that an attorney can never be negligent toward an adversary. There is the argument
I have already criticized that a lawyers' duties run "to the legal system." In addi-
tion, the court denies the existence of a duty toward an adversary because a lawyer
does not intend to benefit the adversary. To support this proposition, it appeals to
the nature of the adversary system. Next it infers that because a lawyer does not
intend to benefit the adversary, the adversary cannot rely on anything the lawyer
says. Finally, the court suggests that to decide the matter otherwise would chill an
attorney's zeal in the pursuit of his own client's interests.
All of these argument have some force. But when we add the fact that the de-
ceitful conduct giving rise to this suit violated the Code, that force evaporates.
Why? Let us consider the arguments in order. First, it is simply untrue that the
"reasonable and prudent" lawyer does not intend to benefit his adversary. The rea-
sonable and prudent lawyer intends to confine his zeal to the limits set by the ethics
code, and that code contains a whole panoply of benefits to one's adversary - ben-
efits, because they are standards of civility that make the adversary's life easier.
Second, the adversary system does not underwrite limitless belligerence toward
adversaries, but rather belligerence within carefully drawn rules of engagement,
which include the ethics codes. Indeed, appealing to the adversary system gives
additional force to the claim that a reasonable and prudent lawyer intends to confer
the benefits of ethical behavior on the adversary - for the rules of engagement are
the adversary system. It is true, of course, that some lawyers adopt a "winning-is-
the-only-thing" version of advocacy (perhaps under the Shermanesque slogan
"Law is hell"); but this has neither legal nor moral legitimacy.6 Third, and as a
direct consequence of the preceding points, a lawyer should be able to rely on the
ethical behavior of an adversary lawyer in the same way that he relies on the ad-
versary not to bribe the judge or shoot the witnesses. If the adversary lawyer is
55. Id. at 122.
56. See generally, David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in ThE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND
LAWYERS' ETHICS (David Luban ed. 1983).
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reasonable and prudent, he will comply with the Code. Fourth, and last, while it is
true that a general duty of care owed to adverse parties might chill a lawyer's parti-
san zeal, it is hard to see why the fact that the lawyer could be sued for violating the
ethics code will chill anything other than violations of the ethics code. All advo-
cacy up to the limits set by the rules is still possible.
What we see here is an interplay between two issues. If the ethics codes are
taken as standards of civil liability, then the arguments against allowing adversar-
ies as well as clients to recover for attorney negligence based on violations of the
ethics codes evaporate. Conversely, once we see that the provisions in the ethics
codes designed to protect the system as a whole are really intended in large mea-
sure to protect other litigants, then the chief objection to taking the ethics codes as
standards of civil liability -that a lawyer's duty runs to the system and not to indi-
viduals- collapses.
There is, however, another objection to using ethics codes as standards of civil
liability, and I shall close by addressing it. Code infractions run from the trivial to
the major, and the disciplinary system is calibrated so that discipline can range
from private reprimand to disbarment. The argument that a lawyer who is subject
to discipline has fallen below the minimum standard of care seems fully plausible
only when the disciplinary infraction is major. It might be thought to be terribly
unfair, if a lawyer could be sued for significant amounts of money on an ethical
infraction that warrants only a private reprimand from the disciplinary system.
The solution is to permit recovery only in cases where the judge first decides as
a matter of law that the alleged misconduct would warrant serious discipline - sus-
pensions or disbarment- if it is proven. With this modification, using the ethics
codes to set civil liability standards seems like an idea whose time should soon
come.
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